OTAN : El dilema de Ucrania

Excelente esta publicación que nos recomienda Leopolis, Publication in ISN Security Watch

Ukraine's NATO dilemma

De la Universidad Técnica de Zürich. Es que cuando los suizos trabajan, lo hacen muy bien.

Sobre este artículo que recomendamos, cito algunos párrafos del artículo de Adrian J Erlinger que, si no me equivoco es el bloguer de Leopolis:

Ukraine grasps with the same geopolitical struggle that Central and Eastern Europe faced more than a decade ago - whether to be a "bridge, buffer or barrier" security zone in Europe.

On the eve of the Bucharest Summit, the campaign to extend a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine seems in disarray. Reaching for NATO's "open door," Ukraine's ambivalence and inaction may prevent entry in to the 26-member alliance.

At this opportune moment in NATO's transformation, the countries of Central and Eastern European (CEE) fully back the closer integration of Ukraine into NATO. These nations firmly believe that Ukraine is strategically important for European security, and a MAP would promote needed military reform and accelerate European integration. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic States argue that a negative response to Ukraine's ambitions would reverse NATO's "open door" policy for new members.

One month before the Bucharest Summit, CEE countries lobbied strongly for Ukraine. On 14 March, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko met his Polish counterpart, Lech Kaczyński, who promised to "take active steps" before the summit to ensure that Ukraine would "hear a positive signal" from NATO. Five days later, nine CEE countries sent an letter to Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in an effort to influence NATO's final decision to extend a MAP to Ukraine at the April summit.

Several NATO allies are not so enthusiastic to welcome Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community, partly due to Russia's vehement objections. One signature absent from the above-mentioned letter was Hungary, which signed a draft agreement to join Gazprom's South Stream project in late February.

During one-on-one meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 8 March, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly indicated Germany's reticence on offering a MAP to Ukraine. A week later, France's foreign minister suggested that NATO must "take into account Russia's sensitivity and the important role it plays" when expanding the alliance.

While it seems that Russia's "selective engagement" with individual NATO members will prevent a MAP extension to Kiev, domestic politics and the current security environment in Ukraine will make a greater impact on NATO's final decision.

Since joining NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, a string of Ukrainian governments have sent mixed signals to its European neighbors on its level of commitment to joining the alliance.

After parliamentary elections in October, President Yushchenko publicly stated that his country would need "several years" to answer the question of the formal process of NATO accession, and only after a nation-wide referendum. This ambivalence suddenly shifted in January when the new government sent a letter to Secretary General Scheffer reaffirming its intentions to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan.

In Ukraine, rock-bottom public support for NATO (at 25 percent) is a result of an intense domestic propaganda campaign waged by Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions during the political crisis of 2006. After losing the September 2007 snap parliamentary elections, the party brandished NATO membership a political and ideological weapon, blocking work in parliament during February. Anti-NATO rhetoric has captured wide support among the electorate who believe that Russia, not NATO, best provides a security umbrella for Ukraine.

In the information vacuum, the "orange" leadership has failed to convince the majority of Ukrainians that NATO has transformed its raison d’être since the Cold War. Instead, pro-western politicians portray NATO as a stepping stone to the European Union, rather than a military alliance.

"In the 1990s, 70 percent of Ukraine's citizens were against entry into the EU. Now this proportion is inverted," Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was quoted as saying in defense of low public opinion for NATO in Ukraine, Rzeczpospolita reported on 27 March.

In public discourse, President Yushchenko defines the quest for NATO as a geopolitical choice rather than presenting the commitments involved with membership or the concrete contributions Ukraine must make to the military alliance.

The lack of a united policy on NATO integration among Ukraine's ideologically and regionally divided leadership is exploited easily by Russia. Citing low public support for NATO in Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that NATO membership would revise "the closest contacts between hundreds and hundreds of military-industrial companies" in both countries, Izvestia reported on 31 March. Speaking to Der Spiegel on 10 March, Moscow's ambassador to NATO, Dmitrii Rogozin, threatened that "Eastern Ukraine would in this case become independent or a de facto state like Abkhazia" if Ukraine joined NATO.

(...)

As the summit begins this week, Central and Eastern European governments will continue to send a clear signal to Ukraine that future entry will remain open. Although NATO does not acutely suffer from a European Union style "enlargement fatigue," it is a military alliance based on performance, not promises. Save a small miracle, NATO will not be convinced that Ukraine is fully committed to reforming its military rapidly.

In Bucharest, Ukraine may find that the door to NATO is merely unlocked, not wide open.

Hasta aquí la cita. Las negritas son mías. Una prueba más en contra de la actuación de Rusia en el caso de Abjasia y el sur de Osetia.

Insiders han revelado que Bush, en Kiev, había ya anunciado que el la aceptación de Ucrania en la MAP sería -en definitiva- rechazada; pero que, pese a ello, su país -y otros muchos, especialmente en en el CEE (hay que mencionar también a Canadá y a GB- la apoyaban.